

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action

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Info

FROM: BEIRUT

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 485, NOVEMBER 1, 6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 485, INFORMATION USUN 44.

POLICY

AS INSTRUCTED DEPCIRTEL 807 I RAISED QUESTION OF CUBAN REFUSAL TO ALLOW VERIFICATION OF REMOVAL OF OFFENSIVE SOVIET WEAPONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER TAKLA NOVEMBER 1. STRESSED WHOLE WORLD HAS WELCOMED KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE FOR SURMOUNTING THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR CAUSED BY PRESENCE OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CUBA. I EXPRESSED HOPE LEBANON AS COUNTRY WHICH MAINTAINS RELATIONS WITH CUBA WOULD EXERT PRESSURE TO FULLEST POSSIBLE EXTENT ON CUBANS TO PERMIT EXECUTION OF THIS AGREEMENT.

TAKLA REPLIED THAT FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS (E.G., NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN FACADE OF LEBANESE "NEUTRALITY") AS WELL AS BECAUSE OF PRECARIOUS SITUATION OF SOME TWENTY THOUSAND LEBANESE EMIGRANTS IN CUBA PARTICULARLY DURING LAST SIX MONTHS, IT IS NOT RPT NOT FEASIBLE FOR GOL TO THREATEN TO BREAK RELATIONS WITH CUBA. TAKLA FELT BEST THAT COULD BE DONE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE TO URGE CUBANS TO COMPLY WITH KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV AGREEMENT IN INTEREST OF PEACE. TAKLA THOUGHT REPRESENTATION COULD MOST FRUITFULLY BE MADE IN UN AND SAID HE WILL INSTRUCT GEORGES HAKIM TO APPROACH CUBAN UN REPRESENTATIVE AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.

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-2- 435, NOVEMBER 1, 6 PM, FROM BEIRUT

TAKLA, WHO WAS AT UN DURING HEIGHT OF CRISIS LAST WEEK, SAID HE HAD BEEN FILLED WITH ADMIRATION FOR MASTERFUL WAY IN WHICH PRESIDENT HAD HANDLED CUBAN AFFAIR. HE PRAISED PRESIDENT'S SKILL IN CONCENTRATING ON LIMITED OBJECTIVE OF SECURING WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET MISSILE BASES IN CUBA AN OBJECTIVE ON WHICH ALL WORLD AGREED. TAKLA OBSERVED SMILINGLY THAT IN ANY CASE IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO STRIKE OUT DIRECTLY AT CASTRO SINCE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET BASES WOULD SO UNDERMINE CASTRO'S AUTHORITY AS TO MAKE HIS DOWNFALL INEVITABLE.

MEYER

BAP

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